As I read through Rosalind Hursthouse’s account of virtue ethics, I am not seeing much in the way of a theory of non-obligatory permissions.
This subject is relevant to her discussion of “positively pleasant dilemmas” - an idea she borrows from Philippe Foot.
But, in the context of the abstract discussion cussion of whether there are such things as irresolvable dilemmas, Foot has nicely raised the possibility that there may be positively pleasant ones. We may be faced with a choice between goods where not having either is no loss, and `there are no moral grounds for favouring doing x over y'.
She creates an example where:
Suppose I must give my daughter a birthday present; it would certainly be very mean not to, given our relationship, her age and hopes, my financial circumstances, and so on. But I am faced with an embarras de richesse; giving any one of a whole range of things is equally desirable and acceptable. So there is an irresolvable dilemma-not one that worries us, not one where the final decision matters, but there all the same-providing a clear case where practical rationality simply runs out of determining moral grounds.
Why is this an irresolvable dilemma?
She describes it as follows:
Virtue ethics directs me to find the answer to this question by finding the answer to another: 'What would a virtuous agent characteristically do in my circumstances?' But the supposition tion that the dilemma is truly irresolvable is tantamount to supposing ing the possibility of the following. We have two virtuous agents, each of whom (let us suppose, rather unrealistically) can give her daughter just one of two things, a or b, for her birthday; there are no moral grounds for favouring one over the other (for if there were, each agent, being virtuous, would go for the one that the grounds favoured). And one does x, giving her daughter a, and the other does y, giving her b. So virtue ethics does not give me action guidance here-which is just what we want, if we want our normative mative ethics to embody the fact that there are such irresolvable pleasant dilemmas, in which there is nothing that counts as the morally right decision.
But this is exactly what we expect in the case of non-obligatory permission. Different agents can choose different actions.
Assume that I had to make a choice regarding which of several $10 bills to give to a co-worker who paid for my lunch the day before. Different virtuous agents may choose a different $10 bill. “There are no moral grounds for favoring one over the other.” However, it is odd at best to call this as”positively pleasant dilemma”. This is a case of non-obligatory permission.
The alternative that I am seeking to defend has a place not only for the morally obligatory and morally prohibited, but also for non-obligatory permission.
An act is morally obligatory if and only if it is the act that a person with good desires and lacking bad desires would have performed in the circumstances.
An act is morally prohibited if and only if it is the act that a person with good desires and lacking bad desires would not have performed in the circumstances.
An act is morally obligatory if and only if it is the act that a person with good desires and lacking bad desires may or may not have performed in the circumstances.
The category of “morally permissible” concerns those area where people generally do not have good reason to promote a universal common motive. What to eat. What to wear. Where to live. What profession to go into.
Which bill to use to pay a debt.
Which present to buy one’s daughter.
The verdict of morality is, “Pick one, for Pete’s sake. It doesn’t matter.”
The ultimate point here is that, on those matters where people generally have little or no reason to promote a universal common motive using the tools of praise and condemnation, they have little or no reason to call one option “right” and another “wrong” (since these are, in fact, statements of praise and condemnation generally used to promote universal common motives).
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