Wednesday, July 20, 2016

Motivational Beliefs

I got into a discussion recently that included the topic of beliefs that can motivate.

I deny that such things exist.

Or, if they do exist, it us because "beliefs that can motivate" is simply an alternative way of saying "desires", and desires do exist. (Actually, more than 2 - but see note below.)

More specifically, I accept David Hume's theory of motivation - updated to include some advances in our understanding of intentional action in the last 250 years.

This modernized version of Hume's theory holds that there are two types of mental states:

Beliefs - which can be expressed in the form "agent believes that P", where P is a proposition capable of being true or false. To believe that P is to believe that the proposition "P" is true. In other words, to believe that there is a mouse in the kitchen is to believe that the proposition "there is a mouse in the kitchen" is true.

Desires - which can be expressed in the form, "agent desires that Q", where Q is a proposition capable of being true or false. Desires lack truth-makers. If an agent has a desire that P, he cannot be wrong in the way that he can have a belief that P and be wrong. However, desires motivate. To desire that P is to be motivated to make Q true if Q is false, or to keep Q true if Q is already true.

It follows from this that if an agent has a belief that P, and P is false, he should change his beliefs - they fail to describe the world accurately. On the other hand, if he has a desire that P and P is false, then he is moved to change the world. His desire cannot be mistaken the way a belief can be mistaken.

Motivational beliefs are typically understood to be beliefs about the value of things. If an agent believes that P is good, then the agent will be motivated to make it the case that P is true.

If this is an actual belief, then it needs a truth-maker. Recall, to believe that P is to believe that the proposition "P" is true. To believe that P is good is to believe that the proposition "P is good" is true. This brings up the question: What does it mean to say that the proposition, "P is good" is true? What are the truth conditions for "P is good?"

I have a suggestion here. "P is good" means "P is such as to fulfill the desires in question." In other words, let us assume that the desire in question is a "desire that Q". Then, to say that P is good is to say that P is such that it can make or keep Q true. Q can either be a part of P, or P can be useful in realizing a state S where Q is true in S.

However, if this is an accurate account of "P is good", then these beliefs do not motivate. To say that a state of affairs is such as to fulfill the desires in question is to say that the people with those desires would be motivated to realize P if they knew about its relationship to their desires. It is the desires that provide the motivation, not the belief.

Just to quickly fend off the most common objections to this account - something can be "such as to fulfill the desires in question" when the objects of evaluation or the desires in question change. A hot cup of coffee may be good when drank by a person who likes coffee and terrible when drank by a person who hates coffee. Wearing a ski mask may be a good way to avoid being identified when one rubs a convenience store, but that is not to say that robbing a convenience store is a good thing to do.

Back to the topic of this post, this account of what it means for "P is good" to be true ties goodness to motivation - but only because it ties goodness to desires and desires provide motivation. What the "motivational belief" theorist needs to do is to provide an account of what it means for "P is good" to be true that somehow brings about reasons to act independent of desires.

An alternative is to deny that "P is good" (as in, "Agent believes that P is good") has a truth-maker.

I would argue that this immediately disqualifies the attitude in question from being a belief. Beliefs have truth-makers.

In fact, if the proposition, "P is good" lacks a truth maker, yet motivates the agent to realize a state in which P is true, then "X believes that P is good" and "X desires that P" become indistinguishable. If you were to examine an agent, there would be no way to distinguish whether the agent has a "belief that P is good" in this sense, or a "desire that P".

This, then, is the dilemma for anybody who believes that a "belief that P is good" can motivate action.

For the agent who believes that P is good, either "P is good" has a truth-maker that explains motivation independent of desire or it does not. I suggest that the agent will be incapable of coming up with a sensible theory for a truth-maker for "P is good" that explains motivation independent of desire. And if the claim is that "P is good" lacks a truth-maker then "Agent believes that P is good" is simply another way of saying, "Agent desires that P."

Anyway, motivational beliefs are make-believe. They don't exist. There is no set of observations that requires that we use such things in order to explain any intentional action. Updated Humean beliefs and desires are sufficient.

(NOTE: As I argued elsewhere, we will ultimately need to also include such things as habits and memory to explain intentional action. However, none of these things provide end-reasons for intentional action and can be left out of the discussion at this level, the way physicists talk about massless strings and frictionless surfaces.)

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